Recently, Li proposed a new password authentication and user anonymity scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography. In this paper, we will show that Li's scheme is vulnerable to the impersonation attack and the denial of service attack. Moreover, we also point out that there is an error in his scheme. To overcome the weaknesses of Li's scheme, we proposed an efficient password authentication scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography. The proposed scheme improves the security and efficiency of the authentication process.
Introduction
Communication networks have brought convenience to people, along with the increase of the security problems. An attacker could crack the remote servers, eavesdrop communication content, modify authentication messages and impersonate identities. User authentication is the essential security mechanism for remote login systems in which a password-based authentication scheme is the most commonly used technique to provide authentication between the clients and the server [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] .
In 1981, Lamport [8] proposed the first remote authentication scheme based on the passwords. From then on, a series of authentication schemes [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] have been proposed to improve system security and computation efficiency in recent two decades. However, most of them still have security problems.
In 2003, Lin and Hwang proposed a password authentication scheme with secure password updating. But Islam and Biswas [15] showed that Lin and Hwang's [16] scheme suffers from insider attack, impersonation attack, known session-specific temporary information attack, many logged-in users' attack and stolen-verifier attack. So an improved password authentication scheme was proposed by Islam and Biswas to overcome the weaknesses of Lin and Hwang's scheme. The security of Islam and Biswas's scheme is based on elliptic curve cryptography, collision-resistant one-way hash functions and symmetric key cryptosystem. However, Li pointed out that Islam and Biswas's scheme is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack, stolen-verifier attack and insider attack [17] . In 2012, Li proposed a new password authentication and user anonymity scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography and smart card to improve Islam and Biswas's scheme. Nevertheless, we find that Li's scheme has some security loopholes. In this paper, we will demonstrate these corresponding attacks and propose an efficient password authentication scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the scheme of Li, and Section 3 analyses the weaknesses of this scheme. Section 4 presents our efficient password authentication scheme. The security proof is introduced in Section 5. Section 6 analyses the security of the proposed scheme and compares the performance of our scheme with Li's scheme. Finally, Section 7 presents our conclusions.
Review of Li's scheme
Li proposed an advanced smart card-based password authentication and update scheme with user anonymity. The scheme consists of six phases: registration phase, password authentication phase, password change phase, session key distribution phase, user eviction phase and user anonymity phase. Fig. 1 shows the entire protocol structure of Li's scheme.
We first introduce the notations throughout this paper as follows:
• 
Registration phase
During the registration phase, a client requests to be a legal user and the server does the following operations:
R1.
→ : , registers to the server with his/her identity and password-verifier = • • , where is a secret random number.
R2. → : , , ℎ(•), (•)/ (•)
After receiving the message from , stores 's identity, password-verifier and a status-bit in a write protected file as depicted in Table 1 . Then, issues a smart card which contains { , , ℎ(•), (•)/ (•)} and sends it to through a secure channel.
R3.
enters into his/her smart card and the smart card contains { , , , ℎ(•), (•)/ (•)}. 
Password authentication phase
When A wants to access the server, he/she should perform the following steps:
inserts the smart card into the card reader. Then, he/she inputs the identity and the password . The smart card generates a new random number 
Session key distribution phase
S1. → : , ( , , , ′ ) S2. → : ( + ), ℎ( , ′ , ) S3. → : , ℎ( , , ′ , )
S4. → : Key Distribution Granted/Denied
In this phase, computes the session key = ( • ) • and computes the session key 
User eviction phase
If the server wants to evict a client , can delete ( , ) , form its verifier table and cannot use ( , ), to login since cannot be found in the verifier table in the password authentication phase.
Provision of user anonymity
Li extends a user anonymity phase to provide the user anonymity. In this phase, the client's identity and location cannot be traced by attackers over the networks.
Registration phase
In this phase, registers to the server with his/her password-verifier = • • and personal credentials, for example, National ID card. generates a pseudonym , issues a smart card which contains { , , , ℎ(•), (•)/ (•)} and sends it to through a secure channel. Afterward, enters into his/her smart card and the smart card contains { , , , , ℎ(•), (•)/ (•)}. After finishing the registration phase, the content of the verifier table is shown in Table 4 . 
. User anonymity phase
When a client A wants to access the server anonymously, he/she should perform the following steps:
U1.
→ : , (
inserts the smart card into the card reader and inputs the password . After finishing the user anonymity phase, the content of the verifier table is shown in Table 5 . 
Cryptanalysis of Li's scheme
Li claimed that their scheme had several security properties. However, we find that their scheme is flawed against impersonation attack and denial of service attack. Moreover, we also find that the verification ( • , ) =( , ) is not correct.
Attacks on Li's scheme
Because the PA1, PA2 in password authentication phase are similar to the PC1, PC2 in password change phase, Li's scheme is flawed against impersonation attack and denial of service attack when a legal client wants to change his/her password to a new password ′ . 
A1.

Error in Li's scheme
Li claimed that ( • , ) equals ( , ). A bilinear pairing was used to assure the correctness of their scheme and was given below:
However, we find that the verification ( • , ) =( , ) is erroneous. In Li's scheme, = • = • • , and
For the reason given above, the scheme proposed by Li contains an error.
Our proposed scheme
This section proposes a new efficient password authentication scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography using smart card. We present our proposed scheme in six phases: registration phase, password authentication phase, password change phase, session key distribution phase, user eviction phase and user anonymity phase. Fig. 2 shows the entire protocol structure of our scheme. The proposed scheme is described as follows. 
Registration phase
R1.
R2.
→
After receiving the message from , stores 's identity, password-verifier and a status-bit in a write protected file as depicted in Table 1 . Afterward, issues a smart card which contains { , , ℎ(•), (•)/ (•)} and sends it to through a secure channel.
R3.
enters into his/her smart card and the smart card contains { , , , ℎ(•), (•)/ (•)}.
Password authentication phase
When A wants to access the server, he/she must perform the following steps:
inserts the smart card into the card reader, then inputs the identity and the password . The smart card generates a new random number 
Session key distribution phase
S1.
→ :
S4. → : Key Distribution Granted/Denied
In this phase, computes the session key = • and computes the session key 
User eviction phase
If the server wants to evict a client , can delete ( , ) from its verifier table and cannot use ( , ) to login since cannot be found in the verifier table in the password authentication phase.
Provision of user anonymity
We also extend a user anonymity scheme to provide the user anonymity. In this scheme, the client's true identity and location cannot be traced by any attackers over public networks. Fig. 3 shows our user anonymity scheme. After finishing the user anonymity phase, the content of the verifier table is shown in Table 5 .
Security proof
In this section, we will prove that our scheme is secure and practical based on the Burrows-AbadiNeedham (BAN) logic [18, 19] . In our proposed scheme, the password authentication phase and the password change phase are similar. Compared with the password authentication phase, the session key distribution phase just have one more step (computing the session key). So, the session key distribution phase contains the password authentication. As the result, we only need to prove that the session key distribution phase of our proposed scheme is secure. Then, we can affirm that our proposed scheme is secure. We describe our process of proof in the following steps:
Step 1: We show the goals of the session key distribution phase in our proposed scheme as follows: Step 2: We transform the session key distribution phase of our proposed scheme to the idealized form as follows: Step 3: We represent the assumptions about the initial state of the session key distribution phase in our proposed scheme as follows:
Aspt 2: | ≡ #( ).
Aspt 3: | ≡ #( ).
Aspt 4: | ≡ #( ↔ ).
Aspt 5: | ≡ #( ↔ ).
Aspt 6: | ≡ ⇒ ( ↔ ).
Aspt 7: | ≡ ⇒ ( ↔ ).
Aspt 8: | ≡ ( ↔ ).
S7 G1,2 : | ≡ ( ↔ ).
According to = (ℎ( ′ ) • • ) • , we could achieve:
2) The proof of Goal 3 and Goal 4: According the Msg 1, we can know: S1 G3,4 : ⊲ ( , , ↔ ) .
According to Aspt 5, we apply the messagemeaning rule to achieve: S2 G3,4 : |≡ |~( , , ↔ ). Table 6 . Notations 
The jurisdiction rule
According to Aspt 3, we apply the freshnessconjuncatenation rule to achieve:
).
According to S10G3,4, we apply the BAN logic rule to break conjunctions to achieve:
According to S6G3,4 and = • , we could achieve:
According the proof above, we can know that both and believe that the session key is shared between and .
Security analysis and comparisons
In this section, we will demonstrate that our proposed scheme is more efficient and secure than Li's scheme. Our proposed scheme is secure against various attacks and can achieve all security requirements. The cyber criminal might perform various attacks as follows.
Resistance to smart card loss attack
A client 's smart card contains { , , , ℎ(•), (•)/ (•)}. If the cyber criminal steals the smart card, he/she could only get the secret data from it, the other data in the smart card are public to all clients. However, he/she doesn't know the identity or the password of . As a result, he/she cannot use the secret data to impersonate the client to login in the server for some resources or guess the password of utilizing the password-guessing attack. Therefore, our proposed scheme can withstand the smart card loss attack.
Resistance to offline password guessing attack
In our scheme, if an adversary eavesdrops the messages exchanged between the client and the server , he/she cannot guess the password from those messages. Because the adversary dose not know A's random number , he/she cannot guess the password from the encryption key ( , ) = = • • = • • • , the sum of ( + ) and those hash values.
Resistance to insider attack
Even if the adversary steals the identity and password-verifier from the server's verifier table, he/she cannot impersonate a legal client to access the server. The adversary has no idea to derive the password and the random number from the password-verifier = • • . So, he/she is unable to compute a valid encrypted message ( , ℎ( ′ ), , ′ ).
Resistance to impersonation attack
An adversary may attempt to forge a valid login message to masquerade the legal client and login in the server. However, it is impossible for the adversary to compute a valid ′ without the knowledge of the client's password. Moreover, the adversary is unable to forge and a valid login request ( , ℎ( ′ ), , ′ ) , because the symmetric secret key is known only to the client and the server.
Resistance to denial of service attack
In general, a denial-of-service (DoS) attack can disrupt the availability of the authentication between the clients and the server. If the server undertakes too many computationally expensive cryptographic operations, the resources of the server would be exhausted immediately. However, our proposed scheme no longer needs bilinear pairing operations and reduces the burden on the server. Therefore, our proposed scheme is secure against DoS attacks.
Mutual authentication
Mutual authentication is an essential requirement in many systems. In step PA3 of our scheme, the client sends ( , ℎ( ′ ), , ′ ) to the server. The server verifies the user by checking whether ℎ( ′ ) • ′ equals , then sends the message {( + ), ℎ( , ′ )} to the client. After receiving these messages from the server, only the legal client can obtain to authenticate the server by checking whether the hashed result of ( , ′ ) equals the received ℎ( , ′ ) and sends ℎ( , , ′ ) to the server. The server must check whether the hashed result of ( , , ′ ) equals the received ℎ( , , ′ ). After the authentication steps, the client and the server replaced old and with new ′ and ′ . Obviously, our scheme can achieve mutual authentication.
Freely choosing identity, freely choosing and updating the password
In the registration phase of our proposed scheme, a client can freely choose his/her identity and password . The server only stores identity and password-verifier = • • . Nobody except the client knows the . After the registration phase, the client can update his/her password through the password change phase.
Provide perfect forward secrecy
Perfect forward secrecy means that the attacker cannot extract the past session keys, even if he/she succeeds to obtain a subset of session keys in some way. In our proposed scheme, the session key
is established with the secure random number , ′ and ( , ′ are chosen by the client and is chosen by the server). Obviously, the session keys are independent. Even if the attacker obtains some session keys, he/she cannot achieve any other session keys. Therefore, our proposed scheme can provide perfect forward secrecy. User anonymity phase 5H+4S+8P+2A 4H+2E+4S+9P+2A
Performance analysis
A comparison of our scheme and that of Li is summarized in Table 7 . We define the notation H as a one-way hash function, E as a bilinear pairing, S as the operation of symmetric encryption/decryption, P as the operation of point multiplication and A as the operation of elliptic curve point addition/subtraction. We know that one-way hash function is more efficient than the operation of point multiplication. The scheme proposed by Li used bilinear pairing which is abandoned in our scheme to authenticate a client. Based on the description above, our scheme is more simple and efficient than Li's scheme.
Conclusions
In this paper, we discuss the security flaws of the password authentication and user anonymity scheme proposed by Li. Due to the similarity of password authentication phase and password change phase, when a legal client wants to change his/her password, a cyber criminal can impersonate to access the server. We also find that the verification ( • , ) =( , ) in Li's scheme is not correct. Moreover, the scheme proposed by Li used bilinear pairing to authenticate a client. Then we proposed an efficient password authentication scheme using smart card based on elliptic curve cryptography. Comparing with Li's scheme, our scheme has lower computation costs, and is more secure than Li's scheme.
